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The Importance, Design and Implementation of
a Middleware for Networked Control Systems
Kyoung-Dae Kim and P. R. Kumar
Abstract Due to the advancement of computing and communication technology,
networked control systems may soon become prevalent in many control applica-
tions. While the capability of employing the communication network in the control
loop certainly provides many benefits, it also raises several challenges which need
to be overcome to utilize the benefits.
In this chapter, we focus on one major challenge: a middleware framework that en-
ables a networked control system to be implemented. Indeed our thesis is that a
middleware for networked control sys important for the future of networked control
systems.
We discuss the fundamental issues which need to be considered in the design and
development of an appropriate middleware for networked control systems. We de-
scribe Etherware, a middleware for networked control system which has been devel-
oped at the University of Illinois, as an example of such a middleware framework,
to illustrate how these issues can be addressed in the design of a middleware. Using
a networked inverted pendulum control system as an example, we demonstrate the
powerful capabilities provided by Etherware for a networked control system.
1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, communication and computing technologies have
advanced tremendously. Consequently, the platform for the control system itself
also has changed with the emergence of networked control. In general, a networked
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control system is a system whose constituents such as sensors, actuators, and con-
trollers are distributed over a network, and their corresponding control-loops are
formed through a network layer. Thus, the scale of the networked control system
is typically much larger than that of classical control systems. An example of such
a system, an automatic traffic control system, established in the IT Convergence
Laboratory at the University of Illinois, is shown in Fig. 1 (see [1]).
In addition to the scale of the system, the complexity of a networked control
system is also greater. Due to the existence of the networked communication and
computation system below the control application layer, several challenging issues
such as communication delay, the interface between a control application and the
network layer, platform heterogeneity, clock differences between the computers,
and others, arise. Clearly, all of these constitute an extraordinarily big burden on
control engineers if they have to address these issues too, while designing of the
control loops.
One solution to release these burdens from the control engineer is to interpose an
abstraction layer between the application layer and the underlying networked com-
munication and computation layer. Such an abstraction layer can encapsulate the
complexity of the underlying system so that the application layer can have a much
simpler view of the system. This can significantly simplify and shorten the devel-
opment of a networked control application. Typically, such an abstraction can be
realized as a software framework, called a middleware. When such a middleware is
designed and developed, it is important to consider the domain requirements which
capture all the characteristics of the application domain. Thus, as a first step toward
the development of the middleware for networked control systems, it is necessary to
understand the fundamental characteristics of networked control systems and then
establish corresponding requirements for the middleware framework.
Etherware is such a middleware for networked control systems which has been
developed at the University of Illinois [2, 3]. In the sequel, we extensively discuss
how Etherware is designed and how it works to support the domain requirements
established from the domain characteristics, since it can serve as an exemplar of
middleware for networked control systems. We also present a particularly demand-
ing application that we have implemented, a networked inverted pendulum control
system, as a case study of a particular networked control system which is imple-
mented on top of Etherware, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of a middleware
framework.
2 Networked Control Systems
2.1 Domain Characteristics
There are many potential examples of networked control systems in various applica-
tion areas, such as smart power grids, intelligent traffic control systems, automatic
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Fig. 1: Traffic control Testbed in IT Convergence Laboratory at the University of
Illinois
warehouse management systems, and so forth. In this section, we investigate the
common characteristics which are shared by many networked control systems in
many application domains.
2.1.1 Large-scale
In a networked control system, the control loop is typically formed through the un-
derlying communication network. Thus, the physical distance between the entities
in the loop is not an issue anymore. Also, the communication network allows us
to form multiple control loops through it so that multiple control objectives can be
achieved at the same time. The Testbed example shown in Fig. 1 is a good example
which has such characteristics. In the testbed, a vision system is used to detect the
state of the moving vehicle, and a low-level controller controls the vehicle to follow
a given trajectory generated by a high-level controller. The inner control loop for
tracking the given reference trajectory is formed through a communication network
since all these elements are running at different computing nodes. Besides this inner
control loop, there is another control loop formed through the same communica-
tion network to achieve a different slightly higher level control objective, which is
collision avoidance between vehicles. In addition to all these, we also have another
control loop in the testbed for runtime system management, such as upgrading or
migrating some software modules to optimize the overall system performance.
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2.1.2 Openness
In a classical control system, it is typically not allowed to change the running sys-
tem. However, networked control systems are open to runtime system reconfigura-
tion. While the system is running, new entities can join or leave the system, and also
an existing entity can be replaced or even migrated to other location in a networked
control system. Depending on the situation, the information flow which forms a
control loop can be dynamically changed at runtime as well. The testbed system in
Fig. 1 can exhibit all of these dynamic reconfiguration features. Clearly, vehicles
can join or leave the traffic system dynamically. If a better traffic control algorithm
is developed, then the existing traffic controller can be replaced by the new one with
a better algorithm, so that the overall traffic control performance can be improved.
Also, depending on the network traffic, a traffic controller may need to be migrated
to another computing node to provide better traffic control performance. Once a con-
troller is migrated, then the corresponding control loop also has to be reconfigured
accordingly.
2.1.3 Time-criticality
A delay in a control loop typically affects the performance and the stability of the
control system. Therefore, a control system is in fact a time-critical system in most
cases. In fact, time-criticality is one of the fundamental characteristics of any con-
trol system, not just for a networked control system. Considering the fact that the
computation and communication network are in the middle of control loop, the time-
criticality might an even be more challenging issue for a networked control system.
2.1.4 Safety-criticality
In many cases, a control system is indeed a safety-critical system which can cause
severe consequences once the system fails. As shown in the testbed, a vehicle control
system can be an example of such a safety-critical control system. In a networked
control system, it becomes is harder to achieve the safety-guarantee due to the exis-
tence of the computation and communication network.
2.2 Domain Requirements
The following are some of the requirements for a middleware framework for net-
worked control systems.
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2.2.1 Operational Requirements
As we discussed in Section 2.1, entities which constitute a networked control sys-
tem typically run on different computing nodes over the network. This distributed
nature of a control system in fact causes several issues which have to be resolved
for correct operation of a control system. The existence of the network itself can
cause several difficulties in the development of a networked control system. Among
them, the location difference and clock difference between entities in the control
loop are two essential issues caused by the distributed nature. Thus, as an underly-
ing platform of a networked control system, a middleware framework is necessary
to provide an abstraction about the networked system which hides all such issues,
so that a networked control system can be easily developed by the control designer.
Besides these two requirements, it is also required to provide a mechanism which
supports semantic addressing (or context-aware addressing) so that the portability
and reusability of the application code can be enhanced.
2.2.2 Management Requirements
As explained in Section 2.1, a networked control system is typically subject to run-
time system reconfiguration since it is an open system. Even though it is still pos-
sible to implement all such functionalities in an application layer, it becomes much
easier and more efficient to develop and manage a networked control system if the
underlying platform is equipped with some functionalities which can be used for
runtime reconfiguration. Thus, as a platform for a networked control system, a mid-
dleware framework is required to provide some mechanisms for runtime system
management which enables continuous system evolution.
2.2.3 Non-functional Requirements
The non-functional requirements1 for a middleware framework are induced from
both the time-critical and safety-critical characteristics of a networked control sys-
tem. The time-criticality requires a control system to behave in a predictably timely
manner so as to minimize the effect of delay. Thus, a middleware framework is re-
quired to provide some mechanisms which support the timeliness behavior of the
control system. Also, the safety-criticality of a control system requires that the mid-
dleware framework itself be error-free, and also provide some mechanisms to toler-
ate faults which can occur in the application layer, to achieve overall reliability.
1 It should be noted that the phrase “non-functional requirements” can be used in dramatically
opposite ways in different communities: with respect to the middleware designer, both a naming
service or communication mechanism are both functional requirements, but achieving control loop
stability is a non-functional requirement. From the viewpoint of the control designer, the reverse is
true. In this paper, the viewpoint is that of the middleware designer.
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3 Middleware for Networked Control Systems
3.1 Middleware Fundamentals
A middleware is a software framework running in between an application and the
underlying platform such as an operating system. Even a control system application
running on a single computer can benefit from a middleware framework. However,
the true value of a middleware is for a system which involves the features of both
heterogeneity and distributed operation. Since these two fundamental features of
distributed systems add a lot more complexity to the application, it is much harder
to develop an application in general. Therefore, it is important to have a simpler
abstract model of the system which hides all the complex details of the underlying
system from an application developer. A middleware framework can provide such
an abstraction of the system to the application developer so that she can develop
an application easily on top of the abstraction. In this way, a distributed application
can be developed more rapidly and reliably. In addition to rapid application devel-
opment, an application can also be made more reliable since many of the commonly
used functionalities which usually require expertise to handle low level complexi-
ties can be developed and provided to the application developer by a middleware as
a form of middleware service. An example is component reuse which can lead to a
component economy.
3.1.1 Communication Mechanisms
In a networked control application, the distribution of the control system applica-
tion over different nodes requires the interaction among components to occur over
a network. For network programming, application programming interfaces such as
sockets are provided by an operating system. But these are usually low level and
require some expertise to use. Also, they are tightly coupled to the underlying com-
puter platform. Thus, they are not appropriate to be used in a platform independent
way for developing a distributed application in general.
In contrast, a middleware framework can provide simpler inter-application com-
munication mechanisms to the application layer by encapsulating these low level
network programming interfaces. A distributed application can then easily be de-
veloped using the inter-application communication mechanisms provided by the
middleware, which allows components to interact with each other over a network
without worrying about the low level network programming which is typically te-
dious and error prone.
In provisioning such communication mechanisms, there are roughly two forms
of mechanisms which can be provided by a middleware, message-oriented commu-
nication and request-oriented communication [4]. In message-oriented communica-
tion, the message sender transmits a message to the receiver but the receiver does
not respond to the sender. In contrast, the receiver replies with a response message
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when it receives a message from the sender in the request-oriented communication.
Thus, the message-oriented communication can be considered as a one-directional
communication model while the request-oriented communication can be considered
as bi-directional communication. Each of these communication mechanisms can be
further classified as synchronous communication or asynchronous communication.
The sender is passive (i.e., its execution is blocked) in synchronous communica-
tion, while it is active during the communication process in asynchronous commu-
nication. Considering the characteristics of a distributed system, the communication
mechanism provided by a middleware is most fundamental to providing an abstrac-
tion of the original distributed system that eliminates several issues related to its
distributed nature.
3.1.2 Naming Service
The other useful functionality which can be provided by a middleware framework
is a naming service which allows an application to easily find or communicate with
other applications in a distributed system. It is still possible to develop a distributed
application without having such a naming service; however it would require the
explicit specification of the physical network address in the source code of the ap-
plications. A naming service provided by a middleware can eliminate this otherwise
undesirable necessity. In fact, from the software engineering point of view, a mid-
dleware’s naming service improves significantly the portability and reusability of
the source code by breaking the connection between the application code and the
underlying platform.
3.1.3 Other Domain Specific Services
Besides the above inter-application communication mechanisms and naming ser-
vice, there are many other functionalities which can be provided as middleware
services, such as security service, transaction service, event service, and so on [5].
3.2 Etherware
In this section, we continue our discussion about the middleware framework for
networked control systems in the context of a specific middleware framework, called
Etherware [2], which has been developed at the University of Illinois.
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3.2.1 Domainware for Networked Control Systems
Etherware is a middleware framework developed specifically for the networked con-
trol application domain. The main objective of Etherware is to provide a software
framework which enables a rapid, reliable, and evolvable networked control appli-
cation development. A networked control application can be easily developed in
Etherware since it supports component-based application development. A software
component is a software module which provides a set of functionalities through a
set of pre-defined interfaces. In Etherware-based applications, the pre-defined inter-
face is used for interaction between a component and Etherware, and components
interact with each other through Etherware. Thus, Etherware itself provides a virtual
communication layer to the application layer. Etherware uses the message exchange
mechanism for component interaction. More specifically, a component needs to cre-
ate a message and sends it to Etherware. Then Etherware delivers the sent message
to the receiver though its message delivering mechanisms. In Etherware, every mes-
sage is an instance of Message class which is a well-defined XML document object
[6]. Listing 1 shows the XML structure of the Message class.
<EtherMsg type=... rel=... >
<profile name=... ></profile>
<content> ... </content>
<ts value=... ></ts>
</EtherMsg>
Listing 1: XML structure of an Etherware Message
The type attribute of the EtherMsg element is used to specify the name of the
message. The name of the receiver component can be specified in the name attribute
of profile element. In the content element, any information concerning the
interaction semantics can be specified. The clock time when the message is created
is specified in the value attribute of ts element.
3.2.2 Architecture
The concept of microkernel architecture in an operating system [7] is used in the de-
sign of Etherware architecture. Therefore, only the minimal invariant functionalities
are implemented in the core module of Etherware, called Etherware Kernel, while
all the other functionalities are implemented as Etherware Components. As shown
in Fig. 2, Etherware components can be classified further into two different layers.
The top layer contains components which implement the application logic, called
application components, while the bottom layer is for components which provide
functionalities to support several fundamental domain requirements, called service
components. The details of these components are explained in the following sec-
tions.
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In this section, we discuss the Etherware Kernel which is a runtime platform for
Etherware components. As a platform for component execution, Etherware Kernel
is responsible for both component life-cycle management and message delivery be-
tween components. To deliver a message from one component to another, Kernel
uses an object, called job, as its scheduling entity. When a new message arrives in
the Kernel, Kernel creates a new job which contains the sent message itself and the
address of the recipient component. Then the Etherware Scheduler enqueues the job
into a job queue. The enqueued jobs are processed one by one by a job process-
ing software module, called Dispatcher. When a Dispatcher processes a job, it first
extracts the address information from the job and then it delivers the encapsulated
message to the receiver component. During this delivery process, some of the ser-
vice components can be called by Dispatcher depending on the delivery information
specified in the message.
Fig. 2: Etherware architecture
3.2.3 Component Model
Etherware’s component model shown in Fig. 3 provides the framework in which an
application component can easily be developed. In designing the component model,
several software design patterns [8] were used. Shell plays a central role in the com-
ponent model. First, it manages the life cycle of a component which is encapsulated
by it. Shell creates or destroys an instance of component as needed. Second, Shell in
a component model provides a channel which allows a component to interact with
other components.
Basic design to implement Shell is based on the Facade design pattern. The
Strategy design pattern was used to design the component interface which defines
a uniform interface between Shell and all components. Due to this Strategy design
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pattern, Shell can do runtime component replacement since every component imple-
ments the same interface called Component Interface. To support runtime compo-
nent migration, another design pattern called Memento was used in the component
model. For component migration, it is not enough to move a component by stopping
at one place and by restarting at other place. To reduce the performance degradation
due to component migration, the execution state of a component should be con-
tinued smoothly before and after the migration. The Memento design pattern was
adopted to support this feature.
Fig. 3: Etherware component model
3.2.4 Services
Etherware supports several fundamental functionalities which are commonly re-
quired for networked control system applications as Etherware services. ProfileReg-
istry is a naming service which is implemented in Etherware to support the semantic
addressing requirement. It maintains information about the profile of a component
and its network address. NetworkMessenger provides the service of message de-
livery over the network. It encapsulates all the details about network information
such as protocol and network address. So, NetworkMessenger is the Etherware ser-
vice which supports the domain requirement of hiding location discrepancy. Net-
workMessenger is called only when a message is destined for a remote component
since Etherware Kernel delivers the message directly if it is for local component.
Etherware resolves the time discrepancy issue of distributed systems by implement-
ing the NetworkTime service. NetworkTime service translates a time stamp from
the clock of a remote computing node to that of a local machine for every message
which is received by NetworkMessenger. For this purpose, NetworkTime service
maintains the clock offset and skew for every other computing node where an other
NetworkTime service is running, by periodically exchanging Ping and Response
messages. The Notifier service provides a time-triggered message service to Ether-
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ware. Basically, Etherware is an event-driven system such that a component gets
executed only when it receives a message. However, in many cases, control actions
need to be performed based on the time. In such situations, the Notifier service en-
ables a component to execute at the time that it has to, by sending a notification
message to that component.
4 Real-Time for Networked Control Systems
Now we turn to the issues raised by the real-time operation that is necessary for
control systems.
4.1 Real-Time System Fundamentals
A real-time system is a system whose correctness depends not only on the logical
result of the computation but also on the time at which the results are produced
[9]. Thus, timeliness is a critical attribute of any real-time task. More specifically,
the main objective of a real-time system is to meet the timing requirements of each
real-time task. However, this does not necessarily mean that a real-time system is a
fast system. Fast computing may help in meeting timing requirements. However, fast
computing alone does not guarantee meeting timing requirements. In fact, a real-
time system is more precisely a system which is predictable, whether fast or slow
[9, 10]. In general, predictability is considered to be one of the most fundamental
attributes of any real-time system. What one basically requires is that the system
should behave in such a way that the execution behavior of the running task set can
be precisely described from the information about both the system itself and the task
set.
Once a system becomes predictable, then it is possible to address the issue of
schedulability of a given real-time task set. Each task in the task set can be regarded
as a collection of jobs. Each job may have a deadline (also called absolute deadline),
which is the time by which the job must be completed. A task is said to have met
its timing requirements if all the jobs in the task are completed by their deadlines.
In a real-time system, a set of real-time tasks is said to be schedulable if all tasks in
the set can complete their execution, while satisfying all their timing requirements,
under some task scheduling algorithm (or scheduling policy). Otherwise, the task set
is said to be unschedulable. A scheduling policy is a set of rules which determine
the execution order, called schedule, among the tasks in a given task set. However,
determining schedules in a scheduling problem consisting of a set of n jobs J =
{J1,J2, ...,Jn}, a set of m processors P = {P1,P2, ...,Pm}, and a set of r types of
resources R = {R1,R2, ...,Rr}, is known to be NP-complete [10]. Therefore, it is
important to consider a scheduling problem under additional assumption so that the
problem becomes simple enough with respect to computational tractability while
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still preserving its practicality. Later, in this section, we introduce some of these
fundamental real-time scheduling theories2. Before discussing real-time scheduling,
we first highlight the difference between a hard real-time system and a soft real-time
system.
4.1.1 Hard Real-Time vs. Soft Real-Time
A real-time task has timing constraints which have to be met for its correctness.
As noted earlier, one important time constraint is the deadline by which a job in
a real-time task has to complete its execution. Depending on the severity of the
consequences which could occur by failure to meet the deadline constraints, real-
time tasks are usually classified into two groups, hard real-time tasks and soft real-
time tasks. A hard real-time task is a real-time task whose deadline constraints are
very strict. The consequence of a deadline miss of a job in a hard real-time task
could be catastrophic. In fact, many control tasks have the characteristics of a hard
real-time task. One can easily imagine that an aircraft flight control task which has
the highest priority among the tasks in any avionics system is indeed a hard real-
time task. In contrast, the deadline constraints of a soft real-time task are not as
strict as that of a hard real-time task. In a soft real-time system, an occasional miss
of a deadline does not cause a catastrophic situation. However, the performance
of the task might be affected by the rate or frequency of deadline misses. On-line
multimedia streaming is a typical example of a soft real-time task.
4.1.2 Processor Utilization Bound
In many control systems, the sensing and control actions are typically periodic ac-
tions. Thus, a periodic task model in real-time scheduling theory can be used to
capture the fundamental behavioral characteristics of control systems. In real-time
scheduling theory, a periodic task can be described by several parameters such as
the execution time (C), the period (T ), and the relative deadline (D). The period is
that length of the time interval between successive arrivals of jobs in the task. The
relative deadline is the time interval from the arrival of a job to its deadline, which is
the latest time by which jobs must be completed. The execution time is the amount
of the processor’s time that the job needs in order to be completed. For simplicity in
schedulability analysis, it is usually assumed that the relative deadline of a job is the
same as the period. With this assumption, the demand for the processor’s time of a
task set consisting of n periodic tasks can be characterized by a parameter U , called
processor utilization factor, which is defined as follows:
U =
n
∑
i=1
Ci
Ti
. (1)
2 For more details and comprehensive coverage of real-time scheduling, we refer the reader to
[10, 11].
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For a given scheduling policy and a given periodic task set, there exists a number
Uub, such that the schedulability of the task set is guaranteed if the process utilization
factor of the task set is below Uub. Above this upper bound, the given task set maybe
unschedulable. Note that the value of Uub depends not only on the scheduling policy
but also on the task set. A critical quantity is the least upper bound Ulub, defined as
the minimum among all Uub over all task sets. Ulub can be used the threshold so that
it provides a sufficiency condition to test the schedulability of any task set under a
specific scheduling policy.
4.1.3 Rate Monotonic Scheduling
Rate monotonic (RM) scheduling is central to several fundamental results in real-
time scheduling. The rate of a task is defined as the reciprocal of its period. In RM
scheduling, the execution priorities are statically assigned to tasks based on the rate
of each task in a given set of periodic tasks. The higher the rate (i.e., the shorter the
period), the higher the priority. RM scheduling is known to be optimal among all
fixed-priority (or static) scheduling policies for periodic task sets [12]. It is optimal
in the sense that if any other fixed-priority scheduling policy can schedule a given
periodic task set, then the RM scheduling can also schedule the task set. In other
words, there is no other fixed-priority scheduling policy which can schedule a given
task set that is not schedulable under RM scheduling. In [12], the least upper bound
of the processor utilization which guarantees schedulability of a periodic task set
consisting of n tasks is shown to be.
Ulub = n(21/n−1). (2)
If we take the limit as n→ +∞ in (3), we obtain Ulub of RM scheduling for any
periodic task set with any number of tasks in it:
lim
n→∞Ulub = ln2' 0.69. (3)
By using this condition, it is very easy to check the schedulability of a given task
set under RM scheduling. If the processor utilization demand is below Ulub, then
the task set is schedulable. Otherwise, there is no guarantee for a given task set to
be schedulable. In this case, the task set can be either schedulable or unschedulable.
To determine the schedulability of such task sets, it is necessary to employ itera-
tive response time analysis which is a task set dependent, schedulability analysis
technique [10].
4.1.4 Earliest Deadline First Scheduling
While RM scheduling is an optimal static real-time scheduling policy, the earli-
est deadline first (EDF) is an optimal dynamic real-time scheduling policy. In RM
scheduling, a priority is assigned to a task and the assigned priority is never changed
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during the task’s periodic execution. However, in EDF scheduling, a priority is as-
signed to each instance of a task, i.e., to each job, based on the current job’s abso-
lute deadline. Therefore, a priority assigned to a task keeps changing depending on
its current execution state. In [12], the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
schedulability of a set of periodic tasks under the EDF scheduling is shown to be :
U =
n
∑
i=1
Ci
Ti
≤ 1 =Ulub. (4)
where Ci is the processor time necessary for executing the task i without interruption
and Ti is the period of task i. Note that the optimality of EDF is immediate from (4)
since the least utilization upper bound it provides for EDF scheduling is 100 percent
of the processor time.
4.1.5 Resource Sharing Protocol
During its execution, a real-time task may access many resources such as data struc-
tures, files, memory areas, peripheral devices, a set of variables and so on. Also, in
any real-time computing system, multiple tasks running concurrently may access
the same resource. In some cases, accesses of the resource have to be mutually ex-
clusive for the integrity of the sate of the shared resource at the same time. For this
purpose, operating systems which manage the resources provide synchronization
mechanisms to allow mutually exclusive access to the shared resource. To synchro-
nize concurrent access from multiple tasks, the synchronization mechanism blocks a
task when it tries to access a resource which is already occupied by another task, un-
til it is released by the latter task. However, synchronized resource sharing causes an
undesirable phenomenon in real-time systems. In real-time systems, a task with the
highest priority should be able to continue its execution under any circumstances.
However, this may not be true any more under synchronized resource sharing. A
higher priority task can be blocked by a lower priority task. This is called a priority
inversion. Fig. 4 illustrates an example of priority inversion [10]. In this example,
J1 has the highest priority, while J2 and J3 have intermediate and lowest priority,
respectively.
In general, the duration of priority inversion can be potentially unbounded since
any intermediate priority task such as J2 in Fig. 4 could indirectly block the highest
priority. This in turn means that a real-time task can fail to meet its timing constraints
due to priority inversion. To overcome this issue, a real-time resource sharing proto-
col, called priority inheritance protocol (PIP), was proposed in [13]. The basic idea
of the PIP is that a task which currently holds the shared resource inherits temporar-
ily the highest priority among the blocked tasks, until it releases the resource. After
releasing the resource, it recovers its original priority. In this manner, the blocking
task will never be preempted by any intermediate priority task while it is accessing
a resource. By adding PIP for resource sharing among real-time tasks in a given task
set, the original RM schedulability test was extended in [13]. Any set of n periodic
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Fig. 4: An example of priority inversion
tasks using the priority inheritance Protocol can be scheduled by the rate monotonic
algorithm if the following conditions are satisfied:
∀i, 1≤ i≤ n,
i
∑
k=1
Ck
Tk
+
Bi
Ti
≤ i(21/i−1). (5)
where Bi is the maximum blocking time, due to lower-priority tasks, that a task Ji
may experience. C and T are the execution time and period of a task, as explained
above.
4.2 Real-Time Support in Etherware
In this section, we describe how Etherware supports the real-time requirements of a
middleware for networked control systems.
4.2.1 Quality of Service (QoS) of Message Delivery
In Etherware, each Etherware component can be considered as a task in a real-time
scheduling model. Also, each message sent by a component can be thought of as an
instance of the task, a job in the real-time scheduling model. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.1, each real-time task has a set of timing constraints such as period and relative
deadline which are required to be met. In Etherware, these timing constraints can
be specified as a QoS specification in each message sent by a component [3]. Such
information is encoded as a QoS element in the Message class object which itself
is an well-defined XML document, as explained in Section 3.2.1. Basically, Ether-
ware defines QoS as a collection of attributes of an application which are used in
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scheduling for execution. Hence, any information which affects the scheduling can
be specified as a constraint in QoS specification. In our current implementation of
Etherware, the period (period), the relative deadline (simply called deadline),
the worst case execution time (wcet), and the importance of a message (crit), are
defined for QoS specification of a message, as illustrated in Listing 2.
<EtherMsg type=... rel=... >
<profile name=... ></profile>
<content> ... </content>
<ts value=... ></ts>
<QoS crit=... period=... deadline=... wcet=...>
</QoS>
</EtherMsg>
Listing 2: QoS specification in Etherware Message
4.2.2 Priority and Concurrent Processing
Concurrency is a fundamental feature of any real system. Multiple tasks may be
released concurrently, and a real-time scheduling policy prioritizes the execution
order based on some rules, while satisfying their timing constraints. Thus, concur-
rency and priority are two key aspects of any real-time system.
As explained in Section 3.2.2, Dispatcher is a software module inside the Ether-
ware Kernel, for processing a job (a scheduling entity in Etherware Kernel). For
concurrent message processing, multiple Dispatchers can be used to form a dis-
patching module as shown in Fig. 5. For real-time message processing, Etherware
uses a hierarchical prioritization mechanism [14]. First, each Dispatcher in a dis-
patching module is assigned a fixed priority3 so that each message enqueued in a
Dispatcher is processed at the fixed priority. The specific number of Dispatchers in
a dispatching module and their corresponding priority levels are determined by a
user-provided specification, called a Thread Scheduling Rule (TSR). Second, the job
queue of a Dispatcher is a prioritized queue which orders jobs in the queue based
on some information specified for a job. Owing to this hierarchical mechanism,
Etherware can support various types of real-time scheduling policies, such as RM
scheduling and non-preemptive EDF. An example of the implementation of a RM
scheduling policy implementation is shown in Listing. 3.
For predictable behavior, Etherware utilizes the priority-based scheduling mech-
anism of the underlying platform upon which Etherware is executed. This means
that the execution order among Dispatchers is determined by the underlying oper-
ating system platform based on the fixed priorities assigned to each of them. Thus,
Etherware Scheduler does not need to handle such priority-based scheduling. It is
automatically taken care of by the platform. Instead, Etherware Scheduler performs
3 The specific priority set is given by the underlying software platform.
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Fig. 5: Real-time scheduling mechanism with three Dispatchers
the scheduling action at a higher level. Specifically, it determines the right place
where a job should be put in the dispatching module. Due to the hierarchical nature
of the prioritization in message processing, Etherware Scheduler uses two pieces
of information, one to select a Dispatcher in dispatching module, and the other to
find the right position in the job queue of the selected Dispatcher. This information
is provided to Etherware Scheduler at runtime by a software module which imple-
ments a user defined scheduling rule, called the Job Placement Rule (JPR), which
maps the QoS information specified in a message contained in a job to the position
in the Etherware’s dispatching module. Listing 3 is an example of the JPR imple-
mentation which utilizes the period information in a message to implement the RM
scheduling policy. The corresponding experimental results are shown in Table 1.
/* QoS : period(P) in millisecond */
JPR queryJPR(Job job) {
JPR jpr;
if(job.P=80) jpr=(Disp#1, NULL);
else if(job.P=200) jpr=(Disp#2, NULL);
else if(job.P=350) jpr=(Disp#3, NULL);
return jpr;
}
Listing 3: A pseudo-code example of JPR which implements the RM scheduling
policy
To test the real-time performance of Etherware, experiments were performed un-
der several different conditions, depending on the execution time of a task with 200
(ms) period. In each of these different conditions, the activation periods and the exe-
cution times per activation of each task are measured to see how much these changes
affect the execution behaviors of two other periodic tasks. As shown in Table 1, the
task with the shortest period is not affected at all by the execution time changes of
the task with the second shortest period. In contrast, the third task, which has the
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longest period, is affected a lot in its execution behavior by these changes. Thus,
this result shows that the periodic tasks are in fact correctly scheduled under the
RM scheduling policy.
Table 1: Experimental results of task execution under RM scheduling policy
Test (mean, jitter) of Execution Time (ms) (mean, jitter) of Period (ms)
Case Task(80ms) Task(200ms) Task(350ms) Task(80ms) Task(200ms) Task(350ms)
1 (14.5, 1.1) (42.4, 15.8) (49.0, 51.2) (80.9, 1.1) (200.9, 29.5) (350.9, 96.9)
2 (14.5, 0.4) (87.6, 16.0) (56.3, 102.0) (80.9, 1.2) (200.9, 29.6) (350.9, 156.1)
3 (14.5, 0.3) (129.9, 16.5) (64.7, 153.0) (80.9, 1.2) (200.9, 29.5) (350.8, 192.0)
4 (14.5, 0.3) (175.6, 17.6) (350.8, 191.9) (80.9, 2.0) (200.9, 29.3) (350.4, 191.9)
5 Reliability for Networked Control Systems
5.1 Fundamentals of Reliable System
The reliability of a system is usually defined as the probability that a system will
perform its functionality correctly throughout a duration of time. A technical mea-
sure of the reliability is the mean time between failures (MTBF), which is the sum of
the mean time to failure (MTTF) and the mean time to repair (MTTR). The MTTF
is a measure of how long a system is expected to operate correctly before a fail-
ure occurs, while the MTTR measures the difficulty of recovering a system after its
failure. As the definition indicates, the failure of a system is at the heart of the dis-
cussion of the reliability. Therefore, we first introduce the definition of failure and
two other fundamental concepts, error and fault.
5.1.1 Fault, Error, and Failure
Typically, all details about what are the acceptable behaviors of a system are de-
scribed in a system specification. If the behavior of the system deviates from the
specified acceptable behaviors, then this is called failure of the system. The imme-
diate cause of a failure is called an error. An error is a part of an erroneous state, a
system state which could lead to a failure by a sequence of valid state transitions.
Finally, a fault is defined to be the cause of an error. Thus, a fault is the root cause
of a failure.
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Depending on the view point, faults can be classified in many different ways
[15]. A fault can be either transient or permanent based on the time duration that
a fault can exist. Typically, a transient fault is much more problematic than a per-
manent fault since it is usually harder to diagnose. A fault can also be classified as
a design fault or operational fault based on the underlying cause of the fault. The
other classifications of faults are based on the symptoms caused by the fault, e.g.,
crash faults, timing faults, omission faults, and Byzantine faults. A crash fault is a
fault which causes a system to crash so that it can never return to a valid operational
state. When a system experiences an omission fault, it fails to perform its designated
service even though it is still operating. Under a timing fault, a service provided by
a system can be delayed. Lastly, a system behaves unpredictably with Byzantine
faults. There is no specific patterns of symptoms caused by Byzantine faults.
5.1.2 Fault Prevention
One approach for achieving reliability of a system is to prevent system failures by
ensuring that all possible causes of unreliability have been removed from the system
before the system is deployed for its operation [16]. This is called fault prevention.
As a first step toward fault prevention, a system needs to be carefully developed so
that all faults which can be anticipated are removed during the development process.
Various techniques or methodologies from software engineering, or formal methods,
can be used during this stage to attempt to avoid introducing any faults into the sys-
tem design. However, it is not usually possible to guarantee that a developed system
is completely free from faults. No matter how thorough the development process,
there may always exist faults. The faults in the constructed system are therefore
attempted to be removed through some experimental validation process. The imple-
mented system is tested under various operating conditions to expose any existing
faults, so that they can be removed. In some cases, artificial faults are introduced
into the implemented system. This technique is called software fault injection (SFI)
[17]. SFI tries to determine what could happen when faults are activated. The infor-
mation collected through the SFI process can be used to both improve reliability of
the system and also to estimate the resilience of the implemented system to faults.
5.1.3 Fault Tolerance
In general, the application of fault prevention techniques to a system is not sufficient
to achieve high reliability. Given this fact, it is usually required that a system be fault
tolerant in order to provide reliability despite the presence of faults. Fault tolerance
is the ability of a system to perform its function correctly even in the presence of in-
ternal faults [15]. There are four distinct activities which provide the general means
by which fault tolerance can be implemented [16]. These four activities constitute
the basic principles which underly all fault tolerant systems. Toward fault tolerance,
errors caused by faults have to be detected first. Thus, error detection is the first
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step for fault tolerance. The common techniques for error detection are replication
checks, timing checks, coding checks, and so on (see [16] for details). Once an error
is detected, it may be necessary to asses the extent to which the system state has been
damaged by the fault which manifested the detected error. This is known as damage
confinement. The next step is error recovery which recovers the system from the
erroneous system state to a valid error-free state. In the error recovery phase, there
are basically two different approaches to recover the system state, backward error
recovery and forward error recovery. In backward error recovery, the system state is
restored to a past valid state which was checkpointed during normal operations. On
the other hand, forward error recovery techniques drive the system to a new valid
state which is produced by manipulating some portion of the erroneous current state.
Finally, the forth step of fault tolerance is fault treatment. To prevent reoccurrence
of the error, it is necessary to identify and treat the fault. One issue in this procedure
is that it may be hard or take a long time to identify faults which caused the errors,
since the relationship between a fault and the corresponding errors is typically very
complex.
5.1.4 Software Fault Tolerance
In this section, we introduce two main techniques for software fault tolerance, re-
covery block scheme and N-version programming. Basically, both the techniques
depend on the effective utilization of redundancy with the expectation that com-
ponents built differently should fail differently [18]. The basic configuration of the
recovery block scheme is illustrated in Fig. 6. The first step in the recovery block
scheme is checkpointing the current valid system state before executing any mod-
ules. Then the primary module is entered. Once the primary module completes its
execution, the execution result of the primary module is tested by the acceptance
test module to detect any error from the primary module if there is any. If the result
is valid, then it is propagated as the output of the block. If any error is detected, then
the error recovery process restores the primary module with the checkpointed state.
Following the recovery, the same sequence of executions is repeated, except that the
next module is used in place of the module that failed. If all of the modules fail,
then it is considered as the failure of the recover block. One issue with the recov-
ery block scheme is that the acceptance test module is highly application dependent
[18]. Hence, its error detection logic is usually required to be implemented by the
module developer.
While the recovery block scheme requires an application dependent acceptance
test module, the N-version programming model can use a generic decision algorithm
to select the correct output [18]. Usually, voting algorithms such as Formalized Ma-
jority Voter, Generalized Media Voter, Formalized Plurality Voter, and Weighted
Averaging Techniques, can be used as the generic decision algorithms in the de-
sign of the selection module (see [19] for details). Another significant difference
between N-version programming and the recovery block is that the output is deter-
mined through a voting process. In a voting process, each of the modules processes
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Fig. 6: Recovery block scheme
the input first, and then their execution results are collected by the selection mod-
ule. The selection algorithm determines the output based on the outputs from all
modules and some decision rules. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: N-version programming model
5.2 Reliability Support in Etherware
In this section, we describe how Etherware supports the reliability requirement of
middleware for networked control systems.
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5.2.1 Local Temporal Autonomy
Local temporal autonomy (LTA) is defined as the ability to operate correctly for a
while in the presence of a failure of the other system components [20]. To accommo-
date the failure of a network connection, nodes or components in a networked con-
trol system, several design principles based on the LTA were proposed in [20, 21].
The basic idea of these design principles is to reduce the inter-dependency between
the interacting components. These principles can be easily understood by consider-
ing specific examples. As shown in the top figure in Fig. 8, in a networked control
system, a controller relies on both the information from sensors and the communica-
tion network through which the sensor information is delivered. If one of these fails,
a controller also fails. The proposed design principle suggests that an estimator be
used, which is collocated, with the controller to estimate the sensor data. Then, any
transient failure of either the sensor or communication network becomes transparent
to the controller.
Another example is the case when a remote controller sends its computed control
value to an actuator component which is collocated on the target plant and delivers
the control to the plant. In this situation illustrated in the bottom figure in Fig. 8,
the proposed design principle first employs a controller to compute multiple steps
of future control values, and then sends them en bloc to the actuator. Secondly, an
actuator is equipped with a buffer to hold the block of control values delivered from
a controller. Clearly, this block computation and buffer mechanism can reduce de-
pendence between a controller and an actuator so that any transient failure of either
a controller or the communication network is transparent to the actuator. Etherware
provides support for both these strategies [21].
Fig. 8: The LTA-based design principles
5.2.2 Component Model for Fault-Tolerance
In addition to the LTA-based design principles, a fault-tolerant component model
(FT component model) was proposed to support the reliability requirements in [3].
Basically, the FT component model is an extension of the original component model
of Etherware. As shown in Fig. 9, it is designed to achieve both redundancy based
A Middleware for Networked Control Systems 23
fault-tolerance, and systematic fault detection and management. The redundancy
based fault-tolerance is achieved by allowing multiple components, the primary and
other replica components, to be executed within a Shell. The systematic fault de-
tection and management is possible through the fault detector and fault handler el-
ements in a Shell. Among the elements encapsulated in a Shell, the fault manager
plays the central role in the fault tolerant operation. It coordinates all the interactions
among elements within the FT component model. The fault management policy (FM
policy) provides decisions about how to coordinate them. Depending on the FM pol-
icy, the FT component model itself can behave similar to either the recovery block
mechanism or the N-version programming mechanism as explained in Section 5.1
(see [3] for details about the FM policy).
Fig. 9: Fault-tolerant component model
The fault detector can be used to detect a design fault related to a component’s
operational semantics. As an example, if the value computed by a component is
typically expected to be both within some range and smooth, then the fault detector
checks if the result from a component satisfies these conditions. If not, it reports this
as a design fault to the fault manager, which in turn calls the fault handler to handle
this fault. If there is a crash fault or a timing fault from other Etherware components,
then these faults can also be managed by the fault handler. Unlike the design fault,
detecting these faults cannot be done within a Shell since it usually requires a time-
based delay detection mechanism such as a watchdog timer. Therefore, an additional
Etherware service, called interaction fault detection service (IFDS), was proposed,
and is being developed to detect interaction delays caused by another component’s
crash or timing fault.
6 Case Study: Networked Inverted Pendulum Control System
In this section, to exemplify the usefulness of a middleware framework, specifi-
cally Etherware in this case study, in implementing a networked control system, we
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present the experimental results of using Etherware to control an inverted pendulum
control system. Basically, two conclusions can be made which are supported by this
case study. First, it can be easy to both develop and manage a networked control sys-
tem with proper support from a middleware. Second, it is important to consider the
non-functional requirements such as real-time and reliability, for correct operation
of a networked control system.
Next, we briefly introduce the inverted pendulum control system which is used
in the experiment.
6.1 Inverted Pendulum Control System
Fig. 10 shows the inverted-pendulum system that is used in our experiment. As
shown in the figure, it has two links. The link in the base is an active one which
is actuated by a DC motor attached to it, while the other one is a passive link. The
inverted pendulum system itself is equipped with a DSP board to measure the joint
angles of both links and to apply the PWM signal to a DC motor. In our experiment,
a controller, which implements a simple state feedback control law, is developed as
an Etherware component, and it runs in a laptop which is attached to the inverted
pendulum system through an RS-232C serial communication channel. For real-time
operation of Etherware, we use the Sun JavaRTS4 as the underlying platform of
Etherware5.
Fig. 10: Inverted pendulum control system
4 Sun JavaRTS is a real-time Java virtual machine which implements the real-time Java specifica-
tion (RTSJ). For details about Sun JavaRTS and RTSJ, we refer the reader to [22, 23].
5 Note that current Etherware is developed with Java programming language. Therefore, Etherware
requires a Java virtual machine which provides the fixed-priority based scheduling mechanism for
correct operation of Etherware’s real-time Scheduler.
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With support from Etherware’s notification mechanism, explained in Section
3.2.4, the controller component is periodically activated to output its control action.
In our experiment, the period is set to 15ms. In each period, the controller begins its
execution by requesting the angle data from the DSP. Once it receives the measured
angle data, it then computes a control output value and sends it back to the DSP so
that the control command can be applied to control the inverted pendulum.
Thus, a periodic control action requires multiple interactions between a controller
and the inverted pendulum system through the RS-232C communication network.
Therefore, in addition to the predictable activation of a controller component in
Etherware, the predictability and the reliability of the RS-232C communication net-
work are also essential factors affecting the success of the inverted pendulum sys-
tem. As explained in Section 4.2, the predictability of the periodic activation of
a controller component is guaranteed by the real-time scheduling mechanisms of
Etherware. However, the predictability and the reliability of the RS-232C commu-
nication network is not guaranteed by the underlying platform in our implemen-
tation. Therefore, we adopted the state estimator LTA design principle to tolerate
occasional communication errors, so as to achieve better periodic performance over
the unreliable communication layer.
Fig. 11 is a still oscilloscope image which captures the serial communication be-
tween the DSP and PC on which the Etherware-based controller is running. From the
figure, we can observe the periodic interaction between the Etherware-based con-
troller and the DSP. The upper signal in the scope image is the signal for feedback
of angle data from DSP to PC, and the lower one is from PC to DSP for requesting
angle data and sending a control command.
Fig. 11: Periodic sensing and control action over RS-232C communication
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6.2 Periodic Control under Stress
The real-time performance of Etherware is verified through a stress condition that is
imposed alongside the periodic control of inverted pendulum. To stress the computer
on which a periodic control task is running, an extra computational task is made to
run concurrently with the control task. In this experiment, the stress task is also
executed periodically with a period of 5 seconds. Once it begins its execution, the
stress task requires about 1 second to finish its computation. Considering that the
period of control task is only 15 ms, as explained in the above section, 1 second
is long enough to disturb the stability of the inverted pendulum, if the real-time
performance had not been supported by Etherware. To achieve timely execution
behavior of the periodic control task, the periodic notification message from Notifier
to the periodic control task is specified to have a higher priority than that of the stress
task. Fig. 12 shows the experimental result of this experiment. In the experiment, the
stress task starts its execution around 20 seconds after the system starts. As shown
in the result, there is no apparent adverse affect on control performance even under
the stress condition. This demonstrate Etherware’s real-time performance.
Fig. 12: Periodic control of an inverted pendulum under stress
6.3 Runtime System Management
As explained in Section 3.2, Etherware provides mechanisms which support the con-
tinuous evolution of a system after its deployment. The component model is at the
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heart of such mechanisms. The combination of these mechanisms for flexibility, and
the real-time mechanisms for temporal predictability, generate capabilities which
enable us to do runtime management of a system, especially a time-critical control
system, without sacrificing the system’s stability. The specific capabilities that we
aim to provide are controller upgrade and controller migration. In this section, we
demonstrate these capabilities of Etherware.
6.3.1 Controller Upgrade
In this experiment, we show Etherware’s capability for runtime component upgrade.
More specifically, a running inverted pendulum controller is replaced with a new
controller which has better control performance, while still maintaining the stability
of the inverted pendulum. To perform this upgrading process correctly without vi-
olating the stability of running system, it is important to externalize the state of the
running controller and recover the state with a new controller timely. Etherware sup-
ports this operation though its component model which enables component upgrade
and its real-time scheduling mechanism.
Fig. 13 shows the configuration of an application for this runtime controller up-
grade experiment. The periodic controller is running on a computer which is di-
rectly connected to the inverted pendulum system through a serial port. On the other
computer, a component which requests the controller upgrade is running. In the ex-
periment, the requester component sends a request message for better control per-
formance around 30 seconds after the system starts. As shown in the figure, the
control performance is improved around 30 seconds, at the time when the controller
upgrade is requested. Thus, this result demonstrates Etherware’s capability of real-
time component upgrade.
Fig. 13: Joint angles of the inverted pendulum under runtime controller upgrade
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6.3.2 Controller Migration
In this experiment, we demonstrate Etherware’s capability for runtime component
migration. More specifically, a controller which controls the inverted pendulum is
migrated from one computer to another at runtime while preserving the stability of
the inverted pendulum. This type of capability can be very useful in a wide range
of applications in optimizing the behavior of control systems. For example, if the
network causes long delay from a specific computer in the network, then one may
want to relocate the controller logic, i.e., component, to another computer which
has less delay. For such runtime migration, several more steps of actions have to be
performed, in addition to the runtime state externalization, as explained in previous
section. Specifically, the externalized state itself has to be migrated to the destination
where the controller will be migrated. Also, once a new instance of the controller
is created at the destination node, the migrated state has to be recovered with the
controller. Thus, component migration is a much more complex task than upgrade,
in general. Furthermore, all these actions have to be performed in a timely man-
ner so as to preserve the stability of the inverted pendulum. Therefore, Etherware’s
mechanisms for flexibility and predictability are essential to perform this runtime
management operation. Moreover, Etherware’s facilities make quite simple the de-
velopment and deployment of such advanced capabilities.
Fig. 14 illustrates the application configuration for the runtime controller mi-
gration experiment. Initially, the inverted pendulum is controlled over the network
by a controller which runs at remote computer. At the computer which is directly
connected to the inverted pendulum, a component, called DSPProxy, is running to
mediate the interaction between the controller and the DSP in the inverted pendu-
lum system. At a third computer, another component which requests the controller
migration process is running. In this experiment, the requester component sends out
a request message, which requests the migration of the controller from its current
location to the computer which has the direct connection to the inverted pendulum.
This request is made around 40 seconds after the system starts. Then Etherware per-
forms the controller migration process. As shown in Fig. 14, the stability is main-
tained even while the controller is migrating to a new computer node. Thus, this
result demonstrates Etherware’s capability of real-time component migration.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed fundamental characteristics which are common to
any networked control systems. The four characteristics, which are large-scaleness,
openness, time-criticality, and safety-criticality, are identified in Section 2.1. Due to
these fundamental characteristics, there is a need for a middleware, which enables us
to realize such complex control systems. Indeed our thesis is that such a middleware
is important for the future of networked control systems.
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Fig. 14: Joint angles of the inverted pendulum under runtime controller migration
As an underlying platform for networked control systems, a middleware is re-
quired to satisfy domain requirements which are necessitated by the domain char-
acteristics. There are several fundamental functionalities that have to be provided
by any middleware to satisfy both the operational and management domain require-
ments which are induced by the characteristics of a distributed system. Etherware, a
middleware developed at the University of Illinois, is an example of such a middle-
ware for networked control system.
In addition to the functional domain requirements such as operational and man-
agement requirements, a middleware framework is typically expected to also sup-
port the non-functional domain requirements such as timeliness and reliability. We
have presented Etherware’s approach to support the timeliness requirements. We
have also addressed the issue of faults and approaches toward fault prevention and
tolerance, Etherware’s LTA-based design principles, and the fault-tolerant compo-
nent model.
The performance of a networked inverted pendulum control system is provided
as a case study of a middleware based networked control system. In the presented
system, Etherware is used as a middleware framework which for rapid and evolv-
able control application development. We have exhibited complex and important run
time capabilities such as controller migration and controller update, to highlight the
sophisticated capabilities that a middleware such as Etherware can provide. We have
thus experimentally demonstrated Etherware’s flexibility and temporal predictabil-
ity properties.
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